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VALIDITY OF CONTRACT OF MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORDER.
The recent case of the Order of St. Benedict of Neu, Jersey v.
Steinhauser, 179 Fed., 137, is rather interesting, involving as it
does the legality of the vow of poverty taken by a member of a
religious society as a condition precedent to his admittance to the
order. The United States Circuit Court of Minnesota in consid-
ering the question decided that the vow is not contrary to public
policy, but is valid and binding so long as the member retains his
membership in the society.
The decision is unique in that, although adhered to by the
United States Supreme Court, as well as by the State Courts,
when they have been called upon to decide the merits of a like
issue, the question has been but little mooted in the tribunals of
this country.
Perhaps the earliest decision bearing on the question is that of
Goesele z. Bitneler, 14 How. (U. S.) 589. In that case, a num-
ber of immigrants from Germany settled in Ohio and formed
themselves into the Separatist Society. A plan for the community
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of property, involving the vow of poverty, i.e., the relinquishment
of all individual rights to the ownership of property, was adopted.
One Goesele had been a life long member of the society and at his
death was in good standing in the order. After his decease, his
heirs instituted proceedings against the society, joining Bimeler,
a prime mover in the organization, as co-defendant. The com-
plainants sought a division of the society's effects and an assign-
ment to them of the property contributed by the deceased.
In a decision written by Justice McLean, the United States
Supreme Court had slight hesitancy in denying the plaintiff a right
of action, thus establishing the validity of such a vow.
The case of the Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser extends
the doctrine slightly, for it also holds that property held by a men-
ber, who died in full fellowship at the time of his death, which
was acquired with his earnings, belongs to the corporation and
not to his heirs. In this case one Augustin Wirth joined the
Order of St. Benedict in 1852, taking the vow of poverty as re-
quired by the by-laws of the association; it was further provided
by these by-laws, that in consideration of the taking the vow of
poverty, the order assured the new member a decent support for
his life-time, while he remained in full membership. Conse-
quently the contract of membership in the order could not be at-
tacked on the ground of inadequacy of consideration.
The vow of poverty, as taken by Wirth, required him to re-
nounce his right to individual ownership of property; it further
provided that all property then in the possession of the new mem-
ber, Wirth, as well as property acquired during membership,
should be conveyed to the order as soon as possible.
Wirth, while a resident of Minnesota, and while a full-fledged
member of the order, died in i9ox. At his death he left valuable
assets, including royalties on a number of religious works, which
he had written during the late years of his life. Of these, the ad-
ministrator took entire charge. The Order of St. Benedict then
brought suit against the administrator claiming an equity in all
moneys in issue, and basing their claim on the express covenant
of poverty as agreed to by the deceased.
Justice Willard, in ordering a decree for the plaintiffs and
thus holding the vow of poverty not contrary to public policy,
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said: "That the purposes of the order are not contrary to
public" policy cannot for a moment be doubted. To doubt upon
that point would be to doubt the doctrines of the Christian re-
ligion and the teachings of the moralists of all ages."
In accord with this decision is that of the Circuit Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania in the case of Schwartz v.
Duss, 93 Fed., 528. In that case, the Harmony Society of Penn-
sylvania, which society had been the defendant in several similar
cases, was again involved. The bill was for a partition and was
brought by the heirs of a former member of the order, the mem-
bers of the society being joined as co-defendants. As in the case
of the Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser, the members of the
society relinquished their right to the individual ownership of
property.
The court, in decreeing that the plaintiff had no cause of action,
said: "In view of the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts, 351, and the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Goesele v. Bimeler, supra,
and Barker v. Nachtrieb, ig How. (U. S.), 126, it is clear that the
above recited articles of agreement are valid contracts and that
thereunder, upon the death of a member of the society in full
fellowship, no claim, enforceable against the society or its prop-
erty, passes to his heirs or personal representatives."
The case of the General German Aged People's Home of Balti-
more v. Hammerbacher, 64 Md., 595, although holding only as
to property in possession of the defendant at the time of his ad-
mission to the society, extended the doctrine and allowed the plain-
tiffs to recover possession of property, the ownership of which
the defendant had fraudulently concealed upon his admission.
Justice Stone in rendering his decision decreed that the vow
of poverty was not contrary to public policy, and, further, that
Zolles, the deceased, had perpetrated a fraud on the plaintiff and
that the plaintiff was entitled to have the administrator of his
estate ordered to convey the property to the plaintiff.
And this doctrine is supported even though the administrator
claim the funds or property for the benefit of creditors. Cowles
v. Whitman, io Conn., 21. The decision is upheld on the ground
that a constructive trust has been created for the plaintiff.
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Therefore, it may be said that the vow of poverty as taken by
a member of a religious order, by which he relinquishes his right
to individual ownership, is deemed by the courts to be but an
exercise of that inherent right of freedom of alienation of prop-
erty; it is not contrary to public policy; but is valid and is decreed
to be in accord with all the strict principles of morality.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE SOLELY TO ASSIST THE JURY IN
THE EXERCISE OF A DISCRETION CONFIDED TO IT.
In People v. Luis, 1.o Pac. (Cal.), 58o, the defendant, a
Chinaman, was tried for the murder of a Chinese woman. The
defense offered evidence, that in the Chinese mind, a Chinese
woman amounted to very little and that the taking of the life of
such a woman was not a very serious matter. The object of the
evidence was to enable the jury, if they found the defendant
guilty of murder in the first degree, to intelligently exercise the
discretion confided to them by Sec. i9o, Penal Code, which pro-
vides as follows: "Every person guilty of murder, in the first
degree, shall suffer death, or confinement in the state prison for
life, at the discretion of the jury trying the same," etc.
In holding the evidence inadmissible, the court said: "If we
assume that a defendant in a murder case is entitled to introduce
evidence not material or admissible on the question of his guilt,
or the degree of his offense, solely for the purpose of assisting
the jury in the exercise of a discretion confided to it, we are satis-
fied that the proposed evidence was not competent for that pur-
pose. Whatever evidence may be so introduced, certainly evidence
of the opinion of the murderer as to the value or importance of
the life of the party murdered by him, can play no legitimate part
in his favor."
One of the axioms on which our law of evidence rests is: All
facts having a rational probative value are admissible, unless
some specific rule forbids. Wgmore, Evidence, Sec. io. We find
no rule of evidence that precludes a defendant, in a murder case,
from showing matters, not material or admissible on the ques-
tion of his guilt or the degree of his offense, but merely to aid
the jury in the exercise of a discretion confided to it.
A careful survey of the English cases, and of the reports of
all the United States, shows no judicial decision that can rea-
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sonably be construed as authority for excluding such evidence.
The only decision found that tends to bear out the contention,
that the evidence should be admitted, is the case of People v.
Costello, 15 Cal., 350, in which the defendant, on trial for murder,
offered to prove ownership, in fee simple, of a mining claim ad-
joining a claim owned by the deceased, It was held, that the de-
fendant may show matters which justly tend to exculpate him or
to reduce the grade of the offense. It should be submitted to the
jury, subject, of course, to instructions from the court, as to its
legal effect.
In homicide the definition consists of two parts, the outward
act and the state of mind which accompanies it. If a person is
incapable, because of idiocy or lunacy, from distinguishing be-
tween right and wrong as to the particular act at the time he
does it, he may commit the outward act of homicide and not be
guilty of a crime. There is no other crime in which so many
different possible states of mind have to be considered.
The theory upon which 'the law of homicide is based has un-
dergone many changes as civilization has advanced. Originally,
in the Roman law, homicide was not a crime. In the first stages
of recognition of the offense, a man had power of life and death
over his slaves, and even over his own children. Institutes of
Justinian, Book r, title 9, Movies' Translation.
While the English common law was greatly influenced by the
civil and ecclesiastical laws, it made. homicide a crime, and the
punishment varied, according to the particular era in history, from
the extraordinary laxity of the payment of a bote as compensation
to the person injured by the death, to the barbarous severity of
boiling the murderer to death.
About the beginning of the seventeenth century, the criminal
law was for the first time made the subject of special treatises,
which to a great extent altered both its form and its substance.
The steady growth from that date has evolved into the present
day law, which divides homicide into murder and manslaughter.
Each of those are subdivided into several degrees according to
the state of mind and other circumstances attending the killing.
While our law was going through the process of such radical
changes from the various influences of civilization, the advance-
ment of custom and law in China have been correspondingly slow.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Inasmuch as the evidence offered in the case at bar was for
the sole purpose of aiding the jury, in case of conviction, in de-
termining the degree of punishment, and it tended to show what
is a national idea and theory that has been bred into the minds
of the Chinese for countless ages, it seems that out of justice to
the defendant the court should have followed People v. Costello,
supra, and submitted the evidence to the jury with proper in-
structions from the court as to its legal effect.
THE LEGALITY OF THE CLOSED SHOP.
In the case of Schuarz v. International Ladies' Garment Work-
ers' Union, Chicago Legal News, Vol. 42, No. 7, the legal world
has another contribution, by Justice Goff of the Supreme Court of
New York, on the much mooted question of the legality of the
closed shop.
The treasurer of an association of manufacturers of cloaks
and skirts for women, as plaintiff, brought, an action against
the labor unions operating in the trade, to restrain them from
interfering with the business of the members of the plaintiff's
association, and from acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. It ap-
peared that the unions were maintaining a strike against the mem-
bers of the plaintiff's association; that they had made certain
demands of every manufacturer in the trade, among which was
that not to employ non-union men; and that the plaintiff had con-
ceded all such demands, except that for a closed shop. The court
held the purpose of the strike to be against public policy and
illegal.
There are two classes of cases involving the legality of the
closed shop; one where there is no contract between the employer
and the union to maintain the same; the other where there is
such a contract.
There are two lines of decisions, supported by weighty authori-
ties, concerning the first of the above- classes; one line holding
that moral coercion, on the part of the unions, to compel the em-
ployer to maintain a closed shop is legal, National Protective As-
sociation v. Cummings, 17o N. Y., 315; Parkinson v. Building
Trades Council, 154 Cal., 581; the other line holding that such
action on the part of the unions is illegal, Plant v. Wood, 176
Mass., 996; Luke v. The Clothing Cutters and Trimmers' As-
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sembly, 77 Md., 396. These two lines of decisions show the two
radically different methods the courts have of ascertaining wheth-
er the defendants have or have not committed a legal wrong.
The courts that consider the actions of the defendants to be
legal, consider primarily the rights of the defendants, that a
man, not under a contract with another, may work or refuse to
work as he pleases, and whatever one man may do alone, he may
do in combination with others. National Protective Association
v. Cummings, supra. The courts that held the opposite view
consider the injury done to the plaintiff, and assume that if the
defendants have injured the plaintiff, they are liable for the in-
jury, unless they can show a legal excuse. International & Great
Northern R. Co. v. Greenwood, 2 Tex., C. A., 81; Erdman v.
Mitchell, 207 Pa. St., 89.
In this day of powerful combinations there can be no doubt
that the granting or withholding of labor may be made under
circumstances and conditions which inflicts injury on others, and
leaves the actors without any legal excuse for the injury inflicted.
Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed., 310.
With the courts differing on the fundamental principles, as to
the liability of the defendants, it becomes desirable that there
should be some criterion by which the legality or illegality of the
defendant's acts might be established. This criterion certainly
cannot be found in recognizing an inherent right in man to do
certain acts, irrespective of the circumstances under which he
does them. That injury is done to the plaintiff in every such case
cannot be denied, and the recognition of such a right would be
in contravention of that principle of the common law, which
holds a man liable for the injury he does another without legal
excuse. The public has an interest in the correct determination
of all these cases, and its interst should not be lost sight of by
the courts. McCord v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 198 N. Y., 587.
It seems that the correct rule would be to hold the defendants
prima facie liable for the injury done to the plaintiff, and leave
them to excuse their acts by showing that the best interest of the
public is subserved by holding their actions to be lawful. As
was said by Win. Draper Lewis, 18 Harvard Law Review, 444,
"What is needed is to get rid of the notion that there are some
acts which a man has an inherent right to do tinder all circum-
stances, and hold to the fundamental position of our common law
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-that he who injures his fellow-man is liable for that injury, un-
less he can show that the community regards his act as conducive
to the public welfare."
It appears that the principal case was decided according to this
view. The facts show the unions were very strong in the Borough
of Manhattan, and practically controlled the labor of that trade;
that all the demands of the unions were complied with, except that
of the closed shop, so the question of the legality of the closed
shop was squarely presented for determination, and the court
held. "That the primary purpose of the strike was to drive non-
union employees out of the trade in the borough, except on the
condition of joining one of the defendant unions, that the pur-
pose was against public policy and illegal."
As to the second class of cases-where there is a contract be-
tween the employer and the union to unionize his shop-it would
seem.that the unions would be placed in a better position, as the
freedom of contract is involved. But concerning the legality of
the contract in cases where the purpose is to enforce the contract
between the parties. and to justify the discharge of third parties
according to its provisions, the courts are divided, as in the cases
where no contract exists between the parties.
The case of Berry v. Donovan, .88 Mass., 353, was an action
for damages brought by a workman against the representatives
of a labor union for causing his discharge, there being a contract
between the employer and the union to employ only union men;
and an opportunity having been given to the plaintiff to join the
union, the employer was requested to discharge him. The court
decided the case on the ground of unlawful interference with a
workman already employed, reserving its opinion as to a workman
needing employment and prevented from getting it. But the re-
sult seems to be that the court considered the contract to be un-
lawful; for if unlawful, all acts done under it would be justified.
In the case of Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y., 207, the question of
the lawfulness of the contract was directly presented, and the
court held the contract to be lawful, at the same time failing to
overrule the prior case of Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y., 33, where
the contract was decided to be unlawful, but attempted to distin-
guish the two cases.
It may be said, from the cases just referred to, that the ten-
dency of the authorities is against the validity of such a contract.
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and the reason given by the courts for so holding seems to be
based on the ground of public policy. "Such an agreement," said
the court, in Jacobs s,. Cohen, supra, "when participated in by all or
by a large proportion of employees, becomes oppressive and con-
trary to public policy, because ft operates generally upon the
craftsmen in the trade and imposes upon them, as a penalty for
refusing to join the favored union, the practical impossibility of
obtaining employment at their trade and thereby gaining a liveli
hood."
A TRESPASSER'S RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE WHEN ASSAULTED.
The law of self-defense is older than the law itself. It is well
settled that one has a right to resist force with force when he
is put in fear of bodily harm. But some doubt has recently
arisen as to whether one who is a trespasser .is entitled to the
right of self-defense when he is attacked by the owner of the
premises on which he is a trespasser. This question was raised
ina late Texas case, Cox v. State, 123 S. WV., 696, where the tres-
passer seeking illicit intercourse with the owner's wife entered
his house during his absence and was surprised by the unexpected
return of the owner. The trespasser attempted to flee, but was
overtaken by the owner and was being severely assaulted when he
turned upon the husband and assaulted him. In an action for
aggravated assault the trespasser, Cox, pleaded self-defense. The
court instructed the jury that though the defendant's purpose in
entering the house was unlawful, where he abandoned his pur-
pose and sought to escape from the house before being pursued
by the owner, he may resist the pursuit and repel assault by force
and plead self-defense.
The very nature of self-'defense is such that it should not be
denied to any one whose position is such that its exercise is
necessary to the preservation of his life, yet the very nature of
this doctrine is also such that it should be applied with the utmost
caution. Self-defense is the resistance of force or seriously
threatened force, actually impending or reasonably apparent, by
force sufficient to repel the actual or apparent danger and no more.
35 Cyc., 1373. One assaulted may repel force with force and acts
done in self-defense cannot be an assault. People v. Lynch, 1ol
Cal., 229. Nor is one justified in using force to expel a mere
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trespasser on land. Wharton v. People, 8 Ill. App., 232. An un-
armed trespasser on one's premises must be requested to lease
and gentle means of removal must be employed before a resort
to blows may be had. State v. Burke, 82 N. C., 551. Where the
prosecuting witness, the owner of the premises, was advancing on
the defendant who was a trespasser, in a threatening manner, the
court instructed the jury that the defendant had a right to defend
himself by force. State v. Hutchings, 24 S. C., I42.- In the case
of the State v. Lazarus, i Mills Const. Reports (S. C.), 34, the
prosecuting witness went to the defendant's house to demand pay
for services he had rendered to the defendant. He was ordered to
leave, and upon his refusal to do so, was seyerely beaten by de-
fenddnt with the bar of the door. The court said in its instruc-
tions to the jury that while law permits men to defend their per-
sons and property and to preserve the immunities of their dwell-
ings, it is careful to restrain the indulgence of ungovernable or
revengeful spirits, and while a man may put another out of his
house who persists in remaining, yet he may not inflict a violent
battery.
While it seems from these cases that one who is a trespasser
has the right to protect himself, when put in fear of danger to
his life, yet there are other and more numerous cases which limit
the right of self-defense by holding that one who provokes the
difficulty may not avail himself of this defense. The fact that an
assault was provoked is no defense. 69 Ala., 229. Where the
defendant provoked the difficulty, he cannot plead self-defense.
Henry v. State, 79 Ala., 42. In People v. Miller, 49 Mich., 23,
the defendants went voluntarily on the premises of the prosecuting
witness with the intention of provoking a conflict, and although-
they were attacked by the prosecuting witness, Talman, with a
pitchfork, and disarmed and assaulted him, there can be no pre-
tense that they were acting in self-defense, because the evidence
shows conclusively that they were not in any fear of Talman.
But notwithstanding the number of such decisions, it seems
reasonable that anyone who.is in danger of life or limb may de-
fend himself even though he is where he has no right to be at the
time. Self-defense is the natural and inalienable right of every
human being, and is to be held sacred and inviolable by every law
of human or civil institution, and should not be limited or cut off
by the doctrine of provoking the difficulty. The act which, cuts
220
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off self-defense must be a hostile one reasonably calculated to pro-duce the occasion or bring on the difficulty and it must be so in-
tended by the defendant. McCaudle v. The State, 57 S. W.
(Tex.), 672, 673.
STARE DECISIS.
The recent case of Herron v. Whiteley Malleable Casting Co.,
93 N. E., 555, is of interest to the commercial world, in that it
suggests certain tests for applying the doctrine of stare decisis.
In this case the plaintiff sold machinery to the company of
which the defendant is the receiver, and plaintiff claims a prior
lien upon the funds in the hands of the receiver by virtue of a
statute. Prior to the sale in question, the section of the statutes,
upon which the appellant relies, had come before the Supreme
Court of Indiana in three cases at different times. By the first
decision, Goodbub v. Horning, 127 Ind., i81, material men were
held to have a prior lien, over general creditors on the fund in the
hands of the receiver. When the question came up for a second
time, the court held in McEtwaine v. Hosey, 135 Ind., 481, that
material men did not have a prior lien over general creditors, with-
out giving notice as required by statute, and that the preferred
claims referred to were limited to claims for services of em-ployees. Then when the question came up for the third time the
court held in .cndses v. Iendscs, 145 Ind., 624, in harmony with
its first decision, that the statute did include material men.
The appellant had sold the machinery within three or four
months of the time that the last decision was rendered, and he
claimed that by virtue of it, he was entitled, on the doctrine -of
stare decisis, to a prior lien over general creditors.
The court declined to recognize the doctrine of stare decisis
and placed its decision on the ground that, while the decisions of
the courts of last resort are generally regarded as binding author-
ity upon lower tribunals, still beyond the limits of the case in
which the decision was rendered they are not the law. Such deci-
sions are merely evidence of what the law is, which evidence is
of greater or less persuasive force as the decisions are, or are not
harmonious, apparently well considered or of long standing. A
court, it is held, will never apply the rule of stare decisis where
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the decisions relied upon are conflicting, not well considered, or
made so recently before the contract or property right to be af-
fected, was made or acquired, that the same could not reasonably
be presumed to have been made upon the faith of the decision
relied upon.
While the decision in this particular case was doubtless justi-
fiable where the court in a comparably short interval of time
has rendered two palpably conflicting decisions, the latter opinion
showing misconceptions in the former determination, there can be
found many cases opposed to it. Upon the principle of stare
decisis there are many cases, and a review of them shows that the
courts have taken both sides of the question. Some holding that
former decisions are binding in subsequent cases, while others
hold that they are not. and that the subject is open to review by a
subsequent tribunal.
The Indiana view is supported in the case of State v. Williams,
13 S. C., S46, in which the court said, "The Supreme Court will
not follow the line marked out by a single preceding case, placing
its decision on the rule stare decisis alone, without regard to the
ground on which such case was decided." In the case of Pratt v.
Brown, 3 Wis.. 6o3, the principle of stare decisis arose, and the
court held, that where a question involving important private
rights has been only passed upon once, and cannot be said to have
been acquiesced in, it is the duty of the courts to re-examine such
question when properly called upon. In State v. Hill, 47 Neb.,
456, it was held that in the absence of complications resulting
from property rights, it is the privilege if not the duty of courts
to re-examine questions and modify or overrule previous decisions
shown to be wrong.
The opposing view is also very strongly supported, that-is, that
former decisions should rule. In the case of Gray v. Gray, 34
Ga., 499, the court said that "when a question has once been de-
cided by this court we desire it to be distinctly understood that
such decision is with us, authority. With us such decision is con-
clusive of what the law is, until changed by the law-making
power. or is reversed or materially changed as provided for by
statute." In Semp v. Hasting, 4 G. Greene (Ia.), 448, the court
said that "a rule or principle of law once fully recognized by
the Supreme Court, should not be overruled unless it is palpably
wrong or has been changed by legislative enactment."
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The United States Supreme Court holds that the construction
of a statute by a state court, so far as contract rights acquired
under it are concerned, becomes as much a part of the statute
as if embodied in it and a change of construction is utterly in-
effective to impair those rights. To hold otherwise would be as
unjust, as to hold that a right acquired under a statute may be
lost by its repeal. Geliche v. Dubuque, i Wall., 175; Christy v.
Pridgeon, 4 Wall., 196; Douglass v. County of Pike, ioi U. S.,
677, 687. So generally after a question has once been deliber-
ately decided in the court of errors, such question will not be con-
sidered any longer open in that court. Gibbons z,. Ogden, 17
Johns (N. Y.), 488. Bowman v. Freeholders of Esse.r, 73 N. J.
L., 543, 547.
Several state courts hold in accordance with Davidson v. Beggs,
6o Ia., 309, that a rule announced as a decision of the Supreme
Court will be adhered to without attempting to vindicate its cor-
rectness when it has been the law of the state for at least fifteen
years.
The rule stare decisis means generally that when a point has
once been settled by judicial decision, it forms a precedent for the
guidance of courts in similar cases. It expresses the principle
upon which rests the authority of judicial decisions as precedents
in subsequent litigations, and adherence to it is necessary to pre-
serve the stability and symmetry of our jurisprudence. Menge
v. The Madrid, 40 Fed., 677, 697.
In view of the foregoing authorities, it would seem that while
in this particular case the Indiana court might have been justified
in denying to the appellant the right to rely upon the former de-
cision, still, in cases where it is shown that the parties relying
upon a former decision of the highest tribunal of the state, entered
into a bona fide contract, the court should not deny to such party
the protection of stare decisis. To allow a later opinion to pro-
nounce a former one not well considered would often amount
merely to overruling a decision upon fresh argument, or more
mature deliberation of the former arguments. The result would
be, of course, to greatly interfere with the stability of business
transactions entered upon on the faith of previous decisions and




In many of the states where a considerable portion of the popu-
lation is colored, statutes define the term negro and establish his
status where the same is considered, because of local conditions,
as essentially different from that of Caucasians. Where legisla-
tures have either negligently or intentionally left the terms
"negro" and "colored" undefined, courts have faced difficulty in
reaching exact decisions on the point of just what proportion of
negro blood in a person of mixed racial descent will constitute him
or her a "negro" or "colored." The question is purely academic,
and its settlement lies largely in the discretion of the court, in
combining technical definitions of ethnological experts and ac-
cepted public opinion on the subject.
In the recent case of State of Louisiana v. Treadway, 52 So.,
5oo, an exhaustive review of statutory and judicial law resulted
in a divided court on the question in issue. Here. the defendant, a
male octoroon, was indicted, charged with having lived in con-
cubinage with a female member of the Caucasian race. The
statute governing the alleged offense made criminal, concubinage
between members of the Caucasian 'race and members of the
negro or black race.
The decision hinged on the question in issue: "Was an octo-
roon a member of the negro or black race ?" The court decided,
three to two, that the defendant, an octoroon, was not a negro
within the meaning of the statute.
The dissenting opinion draws no distinction between negroes
and colored persons, claiming that the terms were synonymous by
popular usage and legislative intent, basing their opinion on the
decision in the case of Lee v. New Orleans and Great Northern
Railroad Co., 125 La., 236. Here the court holds that, "since
emancipation, the word colored person and negro have been used
interchangeably." This appears to be erroneous in view of the
accepted definitions, expressed legislation and judicial opinions.
In the case of Jones v. The Commonwealth, 8o Va., 538, the court
held that a man of mixed blood is not a negro unless he has at
least one-fourth negro blood in his veins. With the -possible ex-
ception of Virginia, the term "negro" has not been recognized
as including within its meaning persons of mixed negro blood,
but on the contrary has been so used only when coupled with
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defining words or a definition adopted elsewhere statutorily.
Mississippi Code of 19o6, Sect. 3244; Georgia 2 Civil Code x895,
Art. 3, Sect. 182o; South Carolina Constitution of 1895, Art. 3,
Sect. 33; West Virginia Code of 19o6; Alabama Constitution
i9o, Sect. io2; Virginia Code of 1873, p. 1208, Chap. x92, Sect.
8; Kentucky Revised Statutes of i894, Sect. 2097-2098; Texas
Revised Statutes z895, Art. 3908.
A resmne of the statutes and judicial decisions shows a dis-
tinct classification in which colored persons are differentiated from
both negroes and Caucasians, and the only difficulty lies in deter-
mining the fraction of negro blood in any person which will con-
stitute him a member of the negro race.
Lee v. New Orleans and Great Northern Railroad Co., supra,
holds that, in the absence of proof as to race, there is no presump-
tion either way. Jones v. The Commonwealth, supra, holds to
the contrary that a man is presumed not to be a negro until he is
proven to be one. The latter holding seems to be correct be-
cause in most of the cases the establishment of the accused as a
negro means his conviction, and as every man is considered inno-
cent until he is proven guilty, why should not a man be presumed
to be white or colored until he is proven to be a negro? Prose-
cutions under such statutes are penal in this nature; strict con-
struction against the state and in favor of the accused is the estab-
lished rule, governing.
The Century Dictionary includes within its definition of the
word "colored" as "negroes," persons of mixed negro blood to
the degree of quadroons, i.e., those who have one-fourth negro
blood, but does not include octoroons. There is a decision in the
.ase of The People v. Dean, 14 Michigan, 406, which says that
"all those persons having one-fourth black blood were colored."
The statutes mentioned above, the weight of judicial interpre-
tation and popular meaning seem to show that the term "negro"
includes all persons whose blood is at least one-quarter black.
That is, a black man, a mulatto or a quadroon is a negro. An
octoroon is not.
